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The African Economic Community: Emancipation
for African States or Yet Another Glorious Failure?
Gino J. Naldit and Konstantinos D. Magliveras*
I. Introduction
Since independence, the economies of most African states
have been dominated by a series of financial crises and largely
characterized by sluggish performance.' A combination of internal
and external factors have been responsible for this state of affairs
Internal factors include the pursuit of ill-planned economic
policies; lack of adequate financial resources; deficiencies in
institutional and physical infrastructure; insufficient managerial
and administrative capacities, often leading to rampant corruption;
inadequate human resource development; political instability; and
disparities in urban and rural development aggravated by
ecologically unfriendly agricultural policies and exacerbated by a
population boom External factors include adverse terms of trade,
a decline in financial flows, a decrease in the price of commodities
on which African states largely depend, and high debt and debt-
servicing obligations.4
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' See Rose M. D'Sa, The Lagos Plan of Action - Legal Mechanisms for Co-
operation between the Organisation of African Unity and the United Nations Economic
Commission for Africa, 27 J. AFR. L. 4, 4 (1983); Muna Ndulo, Harmonisation of Trade
Laws in the African Economic Community, 42 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 101, 101 (1993).
2 See The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable Peace and Sustainable
Development in Africa: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., Agenda
Item 10, at 915-17, U.N. Doc. A/52/871 - S/1998/318 (1998).
3 See id.; IEUAN LL. GRIFFITHS, AN ATLAS OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS §§ C-D (2d ed.
1994).
4 See CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE
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Although the international community is attempting to adopt a
coordinated program aimed at ensuring economic growth in Africa,
the African states have arrived at the opinion that indigenous
solutions are not only feasible but also preferable.5 The founding of
an African Economic Community (AEC or Community), under the
auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), is the most
significant development and most ambitious project to date in this
field.6
In 1991 the OAU embarked on an ambitious economic
program by adopting the treaty of the AEC, which entered into
force in 1994.7 The treaty seeks to contribute to the development
and economic integration of Africa, thereby leading to increased
POLITICS OF STATE SURVIVAL ch. 7 (1996); see also HEMMED IN: RESPONSES TO
AFRICA'S ECONOMIC DECLINE (Thomas M. Callaghy & John Ravenhill eds., 1993)
(surveying the major economic, political, and social aspects of Africa in recent years).
I The Fourth Lome Convention, between the European Community and African-
Caribbean-Pacific (ACP) States, is arguably the most important trade relationship for the
developing world. See Fourth Lome Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 I.L.M. 809.
6 See Charter of the Organization of African Unity, May 25, 1963, art. II(1)(b),
479 U.N.T.S. 39 (proclaiming the need of African states to "co-ordinate and
intensify... co-operation efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa").
Economic development has always been a principal concern of the OAU. See D'Sa, supra
note 1, at 4. One of the most important initiatives undertaken by the OAU to promote
economic and social development and to advance the economic integration of Africa was
the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa: 1980-2000 (1980). See
id. The Lagos Plan of Action was the outcome of a joint OAU/ECA venture to elaborate a
successful regional strategy for development in Africa. See id. It aimed at creating
conditions to encourage economic growth in the African continent, particularly in the
sectors of food and agriculture, industry, and energy, and at protecting the environment.
See id. But perhaps its most ambitious proposal was the objective of establishing an
economic community in gradual steps by the year 2000. See id. But see, CLAPHAM, supra
note 4, at 176 (describing the Lagos Plan of Action as "economically illiterate"). As
progress on the implementation of the Lagos Plan of Action faltered, the OAU and the
United Nations (U.N.) conducted an in-depth review of Africa's recovery process and
devised conditions for long-term development in an effort to relaunch the agenda. See
Conference on the Challenge of Economic Recovery and Accelerated Development, U.N.
Doc. ECA/CERAD/87/75 (Abuja, Nigeria, June 1987). The Conference gave impetus to
economic integration and urged African states to address this issue energetically by
pursuing the close co-ordination of their economic and social policies. See GINO J. NALDI,
THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNrrY: AN ANALYSIS OF ITS ROLE 170-80 (1989).
7 See TREATY ESTABLISHING THE AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, June 3, 1991,
30 I.L.M. 1241, [hereinafter AEC TREATY], reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE
ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY 203 (Gino J. Naldi ed., 1992) [hereinafter
DOCUMENTS OF THE OAU].
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economic self-reliance and greater economic stability.' It seeks to
lessen the reliance on foreign economic aid and to eliminate
Africa's inequitable trading relationship with the developed world,
factors that have contributed to Africa's perilous economic
condition.9 Like the European Economic Community, the African
Economic Community also has a social and cultural dimension.'"
This Article examines the African Economic Community
Treaty (the Treaty) and assesses its chances of success. Part II
outlines the basic framework and enumerates the goals of the
Treaty." Part III examines the institutions established under the
Treaty, with a special emphasis on the Court of Justice. 2 The
sources and supremacy of AEC law are discussed in Part IV, 3
while membership issues are explored in Part V. 4 Part VI
analyzes the regulation of substantive law under the Treaty,
drawing comparisons with the European Economic Community
due to existing areas of similarity and speculation that the AEC
may develop similarly, although the history of Africa suggest that
African states will be reluctant to surrender economic power."
Finally, in Part VII, the Article concludes that the African
Economic Community will not succeed without sweeping
political, economic, and legal reforms. 16
II. The Framework of the AEC Treaty
The AEC Treaty was adopted at Abuja, Nigeria on June 3, 1991
and entered into force in May 1994." By virtue of Article 2, an
8 See id. art. 4(1)(a)-(c).
9 See id. art. 4(2).
l0 See id. chs. 12, 13.
I See infra notes 17-30 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 31-84 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 85-128 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 129-62 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 163-94 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
17 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7. The AEC was inaugurated at the 33d OAU
Summit held in Harare in 1997. See 43 KEESING'S RECORD OF WORLD EVENTS 41,674
(1997). Fifty-one African states are parties to the Treaty; forty-two have ratified. See
Report of the Secretary-General on the Status of OAU Treaties, 10 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP.
1999]
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African Economic Community was established.'8 Its wide-ranging
objectives seek to: (1) promote economic, social, and cultural
development; (2) integrate the African economies leading to
increased economic self-reliance; (3) harness and develop Africa's
human and material resources; (4) promote co-operation so as to
raise the standard of living and enhance economic stability; (5)
foster peaceful relations among member states; and (6) contribute to
the progress, development, and economic integration of the
continent. 19
These aims are to be achieved by a number of different means,
including the liberalization of trade between member states through
the abolition of import and export customs duties and non-tariff
barriers, which will eventually lead to the setting up of a free trade
area; the adoption of a common trade policy and external tariff vis-
A-vis third party states; the harmonization of member states' policies
in the areas of agriculture, industry, transport and communications,
energy, trade, finance, and science and technology; the removal of
obstacles to the free movement of persons, goods, services, and
capital; the conferment of the rights of residence for natural persons
and establishment for legal persons; and, finally, the establishment
of a common market.' ° This enumeration of the means to be
employed reveals that, not unlike the European Union, the Treaty
envisages for the AEC a role going beyond the economic sphere and
covering the social and political domains, which might eventually
L. 522, 532 (1998); Bankole Thompson, Economic Integration Efforts in Africa: A
Milestone - The Abuja Treaty, 5 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 743, 744 (1993); Bankole
Thompson & Richard S. Mukisa, Legal Integration as a Key Component of African
Economic Integration: A Study of Potential Legal Obstacles to the Implementation of the
Abuja Treaty, 20 COMMONWEALTH L. BULL. 1446, 1447 (1994); Nutumba Luaba Lumu, De
la Nature de la Communaute Economique Africaine, 8 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 51, 51
(1996).
18 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 2. The AEC forms an integral part of the
OAU. See id. pmbl., arts. 1(c), 98(1). Furthermore, the Treaty and Protocols are integral
parts of the OAU Charter. See id. art. 99. Thompson and Mukisa are of the view that this
language is not conclusive of the AEC's legal personality and predict trouble ahead. See
Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1452. However, since the OAU has legal
personality, it would seem to follow that the same holds true for the AEC. See NALDI,
supra note 6, at 14. Cf TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Mar. 25, 1957,
298 U.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter EC TREATY].
19 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 4(1).
20 See id. art. 4(2).
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lead to political integration.2'
* As is the case with all Regional Economic Integration
Organizations (REIOs), the accomplishment of integration in the
AEC will be effected gradually. 2 Thus, it will take place in six
stages over a transitional period not exceeding forty years from the
Treaty's entry into force,23 that is, until 2034.4 The first stage,
reflecting the, Lagos Plan recommendations, requires the
strengthening of existing regional economic communities and
creation of new ones where they do not exist." In the second stage,
the removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers between member states
and the harmonization of customs duties in relation to third party
countries should be achieved.26 The third and fourth stages include
the 'establishment of a free trade area and a customs union,2 1 while
the next stage should see the establishment of an African Common
Market.28 The final (sixth) stage envisages (a) the consolidation of
21 See id. art. 6(2)(f(ii); Ndulo, supra note 1, at 102; Y. Omorogbe, Economic
Integration and African National Development, 7 PROC. AFR. SOC. INT'L & CoMP. L. 279,
286 (1995); Thompson, supra note 17, at 765-77.
22 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 6.
23 See id.; Omorogbe, supra note 21, at 284-85.
24 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 6(4). Transition from one stage to the other is
not automatic when the relevant time frame has lapsed but is effected only when the
Assembly has confirmed that it has attained its objectives and has approved the transition to
the next stage. See id.
25 See Protocol on the Relationship Between the African Economic Community and
the Regional Economic Communities, Feb. 25, 1998, art. 3, reprinted in 10 AFR. J. INT'L &
ComP. L. 157 (1998) [hereinafter Protocol]; Sunday Babalola Ajulo, Temporal Scope of
ECOWAS and AEC Treaties: A Case for African Economic Integration, 8 AFR. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 111, 116 (1996). The most important African regional organizations are the
following: Economic Community of Western African States, May 28, 1975, 14 I.L.M.
1200 (1975), and Revised Treaty, July 24, 1993, 35 I.L.M. 660 (1996) [hereinafter
ECOWAS Treaty]; Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, 33 I.L.M. 1072
(1994); and Southern African Development Community, Aug. 17, 1992, reprinted in 5
AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 415 (1993). See also Kenneth K. Mwenda, Legal Aspects of
Regional Integration: COMESA and SADC on the Regulation of Foreign Investment in
Southern and Eastern Africa, 9 AFR. J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 324 (1997) (evaluating the
strengths and weaknesses of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC)).
26 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 6(2)(b).
27 See id. art. 6(2)(c)-(d).
28 See id. art. 6(2)(e).
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the African Common Market by allowing the free movement of
persons, goods, capital, and services and the associated rights of
residence and establishment; (b) the integration of all economic,
political, social, and cultural sectors and the establishment of a
single domestic market; (c) the development of an African Monetary
Union with a single African Central Bank and currency; (d) the
harmonization and coordination of the activities of regional
economic communities; 29 (e) the setting up of the structures of
African multinational enterprises in all sectors; and (f) the creation
of the structures for the functioning of the AEC organs.30
III. The Community Organs
According to Article 7(1), the following are the organs of the
Community: (1) the Assembly; (2) the Council of Ministers; (3) the
Pan-African Parliament; (4) the Economic and Social Commission;
(5) the Court of Justice; (6) the General Secretariat; and (7) the
Specialized Technical Committees.31
1. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government
The Assembly, which is the supreme organ of the AEC, has
legislative and supervisory functions and is responsible for
implementing its objectives.32 To that end, it has been endowed
with power to determine the AEC's general policy, harmonize the
sectoral policies of the member states, approve, on the
recommendation of the Council, the AEC's program and budget,
refer disputes to and seek advisory opinions from the Court of
Justice, and take any necessary action to attain its aims."
29 See id. art. 6(2)(f); Protocol, supra note 25.
30 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 6(2)(f)(vi)-(vii).
"1 See id. art. 7(1). The Assembly, the Council, and the General Secretariat are the
same as those of the OAU. See id. art. 1(h), (i), (n). See also NALDI, supra note 6, 14-19
(describing the role of these institutions in the OAU).
32 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 8.
33 See id. art. 8(2)-(3). The Assembly has been given a dispute resolution function
under the Protocol on the Relationship between the African Economic Community and the
Regional Economic Communities. See id. art. 30. Ordinarily, the Assembly meets once a
year. See id. art. 9(1).
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2. The Council of Ministers
The Council is responsible for the AEC's functioning and for its
development.3 4  To achieve these goals, it has been given the
authority to make recommendations and submit proposals to the
Assembly concerning Community programs and the budget, request
advisory opinions from the Court of Justice, guide the activities of
the subordinate organs of the AEC, and assemble the Commission
and the specialized technical committees.35
3. The Pan-African Parliament
The Parliament is established with a view of ensuring the
participation of the peoples of Africa in the running of the
36Community. However, its composition, functions, and powers are
undefined, and the details are simply left to a later protocol.37 There
is, therefore, no indication how the people are to be involved nor
whether the Parliament is meant to exercise any democratic
accountability over the AEC. Although there is no intimation as to
whether it will have legislative or supervisory powers, the answer
should be given in the negative. The Treaty's framework would
imply that all secondary legislation is, directly or indirectly, adopted
by the Assembly and the Council, while the supervision of the
activities of the AEC organs has been entrusted to the Court of
Justice." The Parliament of the European Community (EC)
provides an obvious model.39 Whether the political will exists in
Africa, however, to set up a democratically elected body, over which
the governments of the member states can exercise little or no
control, is open to question.
14 See id. art. 11 (2).
" See id. art. 11(2)-(3). Ordinarily, the Council meets twice a year. See id. art. 12(1).
36 See id. art. 14(1).
37 See id. art. 14; Thompson, supra note 17, at 757.
38 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 8, 11, 18.
9 See Case 138/79, Roquette Fr~res v. Council, 1980 E.C.R. 3333, 3360. The
European Court of Justice (ECJ) referred to "the fundamental democratic principle that the
peoples should take part in the exercise of power through the intermediary of a
representative assembly." Id.
1999]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
4. The Economic and Social Commission
The Economic and Social Commission is composed of the
ministers of member states responsible for economic development,
planning, and integration.40 The Commission, which has not been
endowed with any decision-making authority, is expected to prepare
policies and strategies for co-operation in the fields of economic and
social development among African Countries and between Africa
and the international community; make recommendations to the
Assembly on the coordination and harmonization of the activities of
the regional economic communities; supervise the activities of the
Secretariat and the Committees and assess the latter's
recommendations before forwarding them to the Assembly; and
supervise the preparation of international negotiations on behalf of
the Assembly.4' The Commission does not have the right to
communicate any documents to the Assembly directly but must
channel them through the Council 2.4  This would invariably lead to
unnecessary red tape and duplication of effort.
5. The General Secretariat
The Secretary-General directs the activities of the Secretariat
and is charged with securing the implementation of the Assembly's
decisions and the application of the Council's regulations.43
Furthermore, he is responsible for promoting development programs
and drafting studies on the attainment of AEC objectives.44
Additionally, he is entrusted with preparing proposals on the
program of activity and on the budget and securing their
implementation upon approval by the Assembly.45 He must also
40 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 15(2). Representatives of regional economic
communities have the right to take part in its meetings. 'See id. art. 15(3). The Commission
meets at least once a year but can meet in emergency session on its own initiative or at the
request of the Assembly or the Council. See id. art. 17.
41 See id. art. 16; see also Thompson, supra note 17, at 762 (espousing a view of
the Commission's functions as central to the Community objectives).
42 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 16(c)-(e).
43 See id. art. 22. Thompson sees the General Secretariat as the "nerve centre" of the
AEC. Thompson, supra note 17, at 761.
44 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 22(2)(b), (f).
45 See id. art. 22(2)(c).
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submit a yearly report on the AEC's activities to the Assembly,
Council and Commission. 46  Finally, the Secretary-General shall
participate fully in the meetings and deliberations of the regional
economic communities. 47
Pursuant to Article 24(1), the Secretary-General and all staff
shall be accountable only to the AEC.4' Thus, they are considered to
be international civil servants, who are prohibited from seeking and
accepting instructions from any member state or being otherwise
influenced in the exercise of their duties.49 Although the Treaty does
not expressly state that they are covered by the immunities that
apply to OAU staff, it should be accepted that the General
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the OAU is also
applicable to them.0
6. The Specialized Technical Committees
Article 25 establishes seven Specialized Technical
Committees." Each of them is competent to deal with a particular
sector of the AEC's activities and is composed of representatives
from all member states. 2 Their functions are enumerated in Article
26 and include, within their field of competence, the preparation of
projects for submission to the Commission, the coordination of
AEC programs, reporting to the Commission on the execution of the
Treaty, and ensuring the supervision, follow-up, and evaluation of
the "implementation of decisions taken by the organs of the
Community."53
This last stipulation might give rise to question of interpretation,
as it is not clear how the word "decisions" should be understood. If
46 See id. art. 22(2)(d).
4 See Protocol, supra note 25, arts. 20(1), 23.
48 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 24(1).
41 See id.
50 See General Convention of the Privileges and Immunities of the Organization of
African Unity, Oct. 25, 1965, 1000 U.N.T.S. 393, reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE OAU,
supra note 7, at 38.
51 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 25(l)(a)-(g).
52 See id. art. 25(3).
13 Id. art. 26; see Protocol, supra note 25, art. 6-10 (establishing coordination
organs).
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it is taken as a generic term, then the decisions of the Court of
Justice would also be included. However, this would contradict
their technical character and their overall role in the AEC's structure
as organs assisting the Commission. 4 Decisions should be taken to
mean secondary legislation, such as Council decisions and
Commission regulations.
7. The Court of Justice
Given the lack of any judicial organ in the original structure of
the OAU, the creation of a Court of Justice should be regarded as a
very significant development. The Court has been assigned the task
of ensuring adherence to the law in the interpretation and application
of the Treaty and with the adjudication of disputes submitted to it.55
The Court, whose independence is guaranteed,56 has jurisdiction
over actions brought by a member state or the Assembly on grounds
of a violation of a Treaty provision or of a legislative measure or on
grounds of lack of competence or abuse of powers by an organ or a
member state. 7 Furthermore, it should be observed that, under the
Protocol on the Relationship Between the African Economic
Community and the Regional Economic Communities, the
Assembly may refer any dispute concerning the Protocol to the
Court as a measure of "last resort."58
The wording of Aticle 18(3)(a) is vague, and it is not apparent
whether the Court is empowered to annul Community or even
municipal legislation. 9  The lack of competence to annul
14 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 27 (stipulating that its Rules of Procedure shall
be approved by the Commission).
55 See id. art. 18(1)-(2).
56 See id. art. 18(5).
51 See id. art. 18(3)(a); see also id. art. 8(3)(k) (specifying an absolute majority vote
in the Assembly to refer a matter to the Court). No express provision is made for finding a
member state or organ in breach of a general principle of law.
58 Protocol, supra note 25, art. 30.
59 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 18(3). The Article states:
[The Court shall] decide on actions brought by a member state or the Assembly
on grounds of the violation of the provisions of this Treaty, or of a decision or a
regulation or on grounds of lack of competence or abuse of powers by an organ,
an authority or a member state ....
Id. art. 18(3)(a). Cf EC TREATY, supra note 18 art. 230(2).
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Community legislation would undermine the rule of law and
marginalize the Court to the point of irrelevancy. Such a power
must be implied. On the other hand, the provision can also be read
to mean that the Assembly or a member state could bring an action
against another member state's municipal legislation for lack of
competence or abuse of powers. A capacity to annul municipal
legislation would be a radical development. ° This provision is
badly drafted and calls for speculation which may only be resolved
with the adoption of the protocol relating to the Court 6'
Additionally, the Council cannot bring an action before the
Court even though it may be a defendant.62 The only avenues open
to the Council are either to rely on the parties with standing to
defend its interests before the Court63 or to invoke the Court's
advisory jurisdiction to obtain what in effect would be a declaratory
judgment. The Assembly may additionally confer on the Court of
Justice, jurisdiction over any other dispute.64 Finally, the Court's
judgments are binding on member states and organs of the AEC.65
In addition to Article 18, the Treaty stipulates the involvement
of the Court in the "procedure for the settlement of disputes. 66
More particularly, Article 87 envisages that all disputes regarding
the Treaty's interpretation and application shall be initially settled
through amicable agreement by the parties involved.67 Should this
I Although the European Court of Justice cannot invalidate municipal law it can set
aside a national statute. See Case C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp., ex
parte Factortame Ltd. (No 2), 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905.
61 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 20.
62 See id. art. 8. Other Community organs may also be named as defendants. See
id. art. 8(3)(k) (empowering the Assembly to refer cases to the Court when it has confirmed
that any organ has not honored its obligations or has abused its powers).
63 This has occurred in the EC, in a ruling of the European Court of Justice in relation
to the European Parliament. See Case 302/87, European Parliament v. Council, 1988
E.C.R. 5615, rev'd as inadequate, Case C-70/88, European Parliament v. Council, 1990
E.C.R. 2041.
4 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 18(4). As the settlement of staff disputes is
not regulated in the Treaty, this provision may be employed by the Assembly to cover such
disputes as well. See id.
65 See id. arts. 5, 19.
66 Id. art. 87.
67 See id.
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settlement fail, either party may, within the next twelve months,
refer the matter to the Court, whose decisions shall be final and not
subject to appeal.6"
It is not immediately obvious how these two provisions co-exist.
Assume, for the sake of argument, that a member state argues that
the Assembly, by adopting a certain decision, has acted in breach of
the Treaty. While such a dispute definitely falls within the ambit of
Article 18(3)(a), it is also a dispute concerning the interpretation or
application of the Treaty provision allegedly breached. In effect, the
procedure of Article 87 comes into play. Should the member state
in question attempt, in the first instance, to settle the dispute
amicably with the Assembly, or is it entitled to proceed immediately
with a request to the Court for judicial review of the decision?
Assume further that the former suggestion is the correct one, that
the dispute is not amicably resolved, and the member state refers the
matter to the Court. In such an eventuality, is the matter referred to
the Court as an Article 18(3)(a) action or does Article 87 offer a
distinct and separate jurisdictional basis? The answer to this
question is of some importance, as Article 87(2) provides that Court
decisions are not subject to appeal, whereas this stipulation does not
appear in Article 18.69 Although there is consensus that the
judgments of the courts of international organizations are final and
not subject to appeal even if there is no specific provision to that
effect in the constitutive instrument , this inconsistency could
potentially lead to problems.
Although it remains to be seen how the Court will operate in
practice, the Treaty leaves many questions unanswered. An obvious
omission is a procedure for obtaining a preliminary ruling on the
interpretation of AEC law comparable to that available under Article
177 of the EC Treaty.71 Although the different African legal
68 See id. Cf. supra note 58 and accompanying text.
69 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 18, 87(2).
70 See TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 66
(3d ed. 1994) (referring to the European Court of Justice); P. VAN DUK & G. J. vAN HOOF,
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 133, 156 (2d ed.
1990) (referring to the European Court of Human Rights).
71 See EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 177; see also Gerhard Bebr, Preliminary
Rulings of the Court of Justice: Their Authority and Temporal Effect, 18 COMMON MKT. L.
REV. 475 (1981) (discussing the Court's jurisdiction, the applicability of Article 177, and
[Vol. 24
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traditions may make agreement on this issue rather difficult, there is
no doubt that, if adopted, such a procedure would contribute greatly
to the advancement of the rule of law and would permit the indirect
involvement of private individuals in ensuring that Treaty
obligations are observed in the domestic legal systems. 2
Furthermore, there is no provision on whether the Court may
issue interim measures of protection 73 or whether it will be allowed
to determine its own jurisdiction. For instance, Article 18(3) states
that the Court shall give advisory opinions.74 Does this mean that
the Court is compelled to do so even if it considers the question
frivolous or without merit? In addition, the very limited number of
parties with standing must be criticized as unduly restrictive."
Unlike the African Commission on Human Rights76 and the
proposed African Court of Human Rights,77 no guidance is provided
as to whether the Court can draw inspiration from general principles
the binding authority and temporal effect of preliminary rulings).
72 See Ndulo, supra note 1, at 107.
71 See Guus Borchardt, The Award of Interim Measures by the ECJ, 22 COMMON
MKT. L. REv. 203, 204-06 (1985); Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Force Majeure and
Interim Measures in European Community Law (1989) (unpublished LL.M. thesis,
University of East Anglia (U.K.)) (on file with author)).
74 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 18(3).
71 See Ndulo, supra note 1, at 107. Ndulo argues that the Assembly may refer to the
Court disputes between natural or legal persons and member states concerning the latter's
compliance with the obligations imposed by the Treaty or concerning breaches of
Community legislation. See id. He also points out that natural and legal persons have
proved effective guardians of the EC legal order and have contributed enormously to the
evolution of EC Law. See id. at 109-10. See, e.g., Christopher Harding, The Private
Interest in Challenging Community Action, 5 EUR. L. REv. 354 (1980); Carol Harlow,
Towards a Theory of Access for the European Court of Justice, 12 Y.B. EUR. L. 213
(1992).
76 See African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, arts.
60, 61 (1982), reprinted in DOCUMENTS OF THE OAU, supra note 7, at 109.
7 See Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the
Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, Dec. 12-13, 1997,
OAUILEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(Ill), reprinted in 9 AFR. J. INT'L & COMP. LAW 953
(1997). This Protocol was adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of State of
Government at its thirty-fourth ordinary session in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 8-10,
1998. See, e.g., Gino J. Naldi and Konstantinos D. Magliveras, Reinforcing the African
System of Human Rights: The Protocol on the Establishment of a Regional Court of
Human and Peoples' Rights, 16 NETH. Q. HuM. RTs. 431 (1998) (explaining the Court's
powers and structure and urging the Protocol's ratification).
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of international law, as these have been developed or applied by
other REIOs.78 The Court must be given the freedom to be guided
by persuasive authorities from other jurisdictions. By being allowed
to do so, it will have the benefit of the wide experience gained by
similar institutions.
Finally, there is no express reference to the enforcement of
judgments, and an expectation that member states will simply abide
by the Court's decisions may be naive.79 However, Article 5(1)-(2)
requires member states to take all necessary measures to fulfill their
obligations and allows for sanctions against a member that
persistently fails to honor its Treaty undertakings. 0 This provision
could be used against a state that flouts the Court's decisions.
Given that African states have traditionally been wary of binding
adjudication, past experience might suggest that the Court will be
underused.8' However, the Court has a central role to play in the
AEC's development, and it must be permitted to contribute fully to
that growth. One can only anticipate that the Court will assume
effective powers. The experience of the EC has demonstrated on
numerous occasions that without an active, dynamic, and forceful
Court, its objectives would have been thwarted.8" Neither should the
salient role of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in making the EC
Treaty and secondary legislation effective and in evolving general
principles of EC Law be overlooked.83 The EC experience provides
a role model for the AEC, and it is up to the African states to take
78 See CASES AND MATERIALS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW chs. 13-16 (George
A. Bermann et al. eds., 1993).
79 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 3(e), 5; Thompson & Mukisa, supra note
17, at 1454; Ndulo, supra note 1, at 107.
80 See AEC TREATY, supra note, art. 5(1)-(2).
81 See Tiyanjana Maluwa, The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Among African
States, 1963-1983: Some Conceptual Issues and Practical Trends, 38 INT'L & COMP. L.
Q. 299, 301-03 (1989).
82 See, e.g., Francis Jacobs, Is the Court of Justice of the European Communities a
Constitutional Court?, in CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
AND NATIONAL LAW (Deirdre Curtin & Dennis O'Keeffe eds., 1985).
83 See, e.g., Paul Craig, Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the
Federalization of EEC Law, 12 OxFoRD J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 453-54 (1992); Lars B.
Krogsgaard, Fundamental Rights in the EC After Maastricht, LEGAL ISSUES OF EUR.
INTEGRATION, 1993/1, at 99, 100-02.
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full advantage of it; whether they are prepared to do so remains to be
seen.
According to Article 20, the details relating to the Court's statute
shall be determined by the Assembly and embodied in a Protocol,
which has not yet been adopted." This provision raises a very
important issue. Since there is no stipulation as to the Protocol's
legal form, will it be an international treaty subject to ratification by
member states to enter into force or will it be an Assembly decision?
The consequences of the first alternative are obvious: if certain
members opt not to sign the Protocol, they can never be brought
before the Court of Justice. This would automatically create two
categories of members: those that are subject to the Court's
jurisdiction and those that are not. Such an eventuality is
unthinkable in a REIO, whose effective functioning is based on
uniformity in the application of rules. Furthermore, members may
use their ability to withdraw from the Protocol as a weapon akin to
revocation of a declaration accepting a Court's compulsory
jurisdiction.
IV. AEC Law
1. Primary and Secondary Sources of Law
The AEC Treaty provides for various sources of law. First and
foremost, there is the Treaty itself, which constitutes the primary
source.85 By virtue of Article 18(3)(a), the Treaty takes precedence
over conflicting legal obligations contained in secondary sources of
law, namely decisions and regulations. 6
The Treaty empowers both the Assembly and the Council to
adopt subordinate legislative measures.87 However, the Treaty
establishes a clear hierarchy of secondary sources of law. The
Assembly acts by decisions which are binding on member states,
8 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 20.
85 See id. art. 5(2) (requiring that "[e]ach member state shall, in accordance with its
constitutional procedures, take all necessary measures to ensure the enactment and
dissemination of such legislation as may be necessary for the implementation of the
provisions of this Treaty").
86 See id. art. 18(3)(a).
87 See id. arts. 8-10 (Assembly) and 11-13 (Council).
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organs, and regional economic communities. Once the Chairman
of the Assembly signs a decision, it is automatically enforceable in
thirty days.89
The Council issues regulations that are similarly binding on
members, organs, and regional economic communities after their
approval by - the Assembly. 90 However, no prior permission is
necessary where the Council is acting under powers delegated by the
Assembly. 9 Regulations are likewise automatically, enforceable
thirty days after the date of signature by the Chairman of the
Assembly.
It is not immediately apparent whether decisions and regulations
are meant to take effect without further legislative enactment on the
part of member states, that is, whether they are self-executing.93 The
phrase "automatically enforceable" employed in Articles 10(3) and
13(3) seems to refer to their effect on the international plane,
governing the relationship between the AEC and its members. 94 The
effect in the domestic arena seems to be a matter for each individual
member state, in accordance with national requirements, as
stipulated by Article 5(2). 9' This then begs the question whether the
Court of Justice will take the giant step of adopting the EC concept
of direct effect, i.e., measures which give rise to rights or obligations
which individuals can invoke before their national courts, thereby
88 See id. art. 10(1)-(2). Decisions are adopted by consensus, or failing that, by a
two-thirds majority of member states. See id. art. 10(4). However, the Treaty is vague, and
no quorum is specified. See id.
89 See id. art. 10(3).
90 See id. art. 13(l)-(2). Regulations are adopted by consensus, or failing such
consensus, by a two-thirds majority of member states. See id. art. 13(4). Again, no
quorum is specified. See id.
91 See id. art. 13(2).
92 See id. art. 13(3). As regulations are not self-standing instruments but are always
subject to approval by the Assembly, the conclusion could be reached that the Assembly
may not attack regulations before the Court, with the possible exception of those which
were issued under delegated powers. However, it is rather unclear if an action for judicial
review of a regulation must, by necessary implication, include the decision approving it.
93 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 763-64.
94 AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 10(3), 13(3).
95 See id. art. 5(2).
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promoting the realization of AEC policies.96
Article 5 of the AEC Treaty requires member states to take all
necessary measures to fulfill their obligations. 97 This provision is
similarly worded to Article 5 of the EC Treaty, from which the ECJ
has derived the principle of indirect effect, which requires all state
organs to achieve the result stated in the EC legislation, and the duty
of interpretation, which requires national courts to interpret all
relevant domestic laws in the light of EC law.98 An activist Court of
Justice may follow a path similar to that cleared by the ECJ.
Under Article 8(3)(a) the Assembly can also issue directives. 99
These do not appear to be legislative measures, but rather seem to be
"instructions" or "guiding principles."100  The Council, the
Commission, and the Specialized Technical Committees are
authorized to make recommendations and submit reports, l0' which
are not legally binding.)°
Under Article 8(3)(b) the Assembly enjoys broad general
powers; to attain the AEC objectives, these powers must necessarily
include residual legislative powers. 10 3 So long as it operates within
96 See Case 43/75 Defrenne v. Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455; Cases C-6, 9/90,
Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; Case 34/73, Variola v. Amministrazione
Italiana delle Finanze, 1973 E.C.R. 981.
97 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 5(2).
98 See, e.g., Case 14/83, Von Colson & Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, 1984
E.C.R. 1891, 2 C.M.L.R. 430 (1986) (noting that, while member states may choose
among alternative means to achieve the prohibition against sexual discrimination, any
compensation must "be adequate in relation to the damage sustained"); Case C-106/89,
Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. I-
4135; Case C-91/92, Faccini Dori v. Recreb Srl, 1995 All E.R. (E.C.) 1, 1 C.M.L.R. 665
(1995) (stating that the court must interpret directives "in light of the wording and
purpose of the directives so as to achieve the intended result").
9 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 8(3)(a).
10 Protocol, supra note 25, art. 21(1)-(2). Both the Assembly and the Council can
address directives to regional economic communities and their member states. See id.
101 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 1 l(3)(a), 16(d), 26(d).
102 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 764. However, the ECJ has held that hortatory
measures are not necessarily without legal significance. See Case C-322/88, Grimaldi v.
Fonds des Maladies Professionelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407, 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1991).
103 Cf. EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 235 (allowing for implied powers but only if
the Council "acts[s] unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and... consult[s]
the European Parliament"); Case 22/70, Commission v. Council, 1971 E.C.R. 263, 1971
C.M.L.R. 335 (1971) (interpreting the Treaty as conferring on the Community the power
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the scope of these powers, the Assembly does not suffer any severe
restraint, except that it may not bring about changes tantamount to
Treaty amendments solely by employing this provision.'
4
2. The Progressive Development of General Principles of Law
Through its jurisprudence, the Court of Justice has developed
the fundamental principles of law enshrined in the AEC Treaty,
including the observance of the Community's legal system and the
protection of human rights.0 5 Moreover, Community members
have undertaken to promote and refrain from hindering the
objectives of the AEC. 16  There is, therefore, an explicit
commitment on the part of the member states to the rule of law.'0 7
In addition, it has been submitted that, under Article 18(3)(a), the
Court has the power to annul legislation on the grounds of, for
example, abuse of powers.
Although the Treaty does not define the concept of "abuse of
powers," it likely includes general principles of administrative law
such as misuse of power and bad faith.'0 8  It does not seem
unreasonable to assert that the Court may find that some legislation
violates human rights norms, such as the principle of non-
to "negotiate and conclude agreements with third countries" beyond the scope of the
court's judicial interpretation); Opinion 1/76, Re Draft Agreement on European Laying-
Up Fund for Inland Waterways Vessels, 1977 E.C.R. 741, 2 C.M.L.R. 279 (1977);
HARTLEY, supra note 70, 167-76. See also Case 8/55, Federation Charbonniere de
Belgique v. High Authority, 1956 E.C.R. 245 (finding action beyond the express terms
of the Treaty unwarranted where another express term conflicts with the action taken);
Cases 281, 283-85, 287/85, Germany v. Commission, 1987 E.C.R. 3203, 1 C.M.L.R. 11
(1988) (allowing for those implied powers "which are indispensable to carry out [a
specific] task" that was conferred by the Treaty itself).
"o See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 103. Article 103 of the Treaty provides the
method for amending the treaty. See id.
105 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 3(e), (g).
106 See id. art. 5(1).
107 See Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1454. These authors see the "chronic
disregard for the principle of legality" on the part of many African governments as one of
the most formidable obstacles to economic integration. Id.
108 Cf. EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 173(2) (conferring the power of judicial
review on the Court of Justice with respect to actions brought on the grounds of, inter
alia, "misuse of powers"). See also Cases 18, 35/65, Gutmann v. Commission of the
European Atomic Energy Community, 1966 E.C.R. 103, 116 (holding that "a decision may
amount to a misuse of powers if it appears, on the basis of objective, relevant and consistent
facts, to have been undertaken for purposes other than those stated").
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discrimination on the basis of nationality and sex. °9 Similarly, the
Court may determine that legislation violates more general
principles of law, such as legal certainty," legitimate
expectations,"' and proportionality."' These principles have been
distinctive features of the jurisprudence of the European Court of
Justice."3
3. Supremacy of AEC Law
As the states of Africa proceed towards economic integration
and beyond, they must address fundamental question of supremacy.
Economic integration implies and demands transfer of sovereignty
from member states to the Community." 4 Furthermore, if the AEC
'0o See, e.g., EC TREATY, supra note 18, arts. 6, 48, 52, 59, 60 (prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of nationality) and 119 (requiring "application of the
principle that men and women should receive equal pay for equal work"). See also
Chris Docksey, The Principle of Equality Between Women and Men as a Fundamental
Right Under Community Law, 20 INDus. L.J. 258 (1991) (calling equality a "general
principle of Community law" upon which no law may impinge).
"Ia See, e.g., Case 98/78, Firma A. Racke v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1979 E.C.R. 69
(noting that legal certainty requires that regulations "enter into force at the same time
throughout" the European community); Case 63/83, The Queen v. Kent Kirk, 1984
E.C.R. 2689, 3 C.M.L.R. 522 (1984) (noting that "penal provisions may not have
retroactive effects").
"' See, e.g., Case 120/86, Mulder v. Minister van Landbouw en Visserij, 1988 E.C.R.
2321, 2 C.M.L.R. 1 (1989) (finding that a producer who voluntarily drops out of the
market "cannot legitimately expect to be able to resume production" without being
subject to rules adopted in his absence); Eleanor Sharpston, Legitimate Expectations and
Economic Reality, 15 EUR. L. REv. 103, 105 (1990) (discussing more generally the
principle of legitimate expectations, which is defined as "the particular form of
economic prediction for which an economic agent can claim legal validity in
Community law").
112 See, e.g., Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister for Agric., Fisheries & Food ex
parte FEDESA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4023, 1 C.M.L.R. 507 (1991) (stating that proportionality
requires that the EC Council only enact "prohibiting measures [that] are appropriate and
necessary in order to achieve the objective legitimately pursued by that legislation");
Grainne de Burca, The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, 13 Y.B.
EUR. L. 103, 105 (1993) (defining proportionality as requiring "that there be a reasonable
relationship between a particular objective and the administrative or legislative means
used to achieve that objective").
113 The ECJ had little difficulty in developing these principles because the legal
systems of the original member states shared a common background. By contrast, the lack
of coherence in the African legal systems will make the Court's task far more onerous.
"' See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
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objectives are to be achieved and disparities between members
diminished, a uniform approach to the incorporation, application
and interpretation of Community law seems necessary. As the ECJ
has stated, the European Community "would be quite meaningless if
a state could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a legislative
measure which could prevail over Community law." '115 However,
the traditional emphasis on sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction in
African states is bound to cause problems. '1 6 The success or failure
of the AEC will depend to a large extent on whether member states
are prepared to change their philosophy and abandon their distrust of
supranationalism.
The AEC Treaty is an international agreement entered into by
sovereign states.117 Its ratification takes place in accordance with the
constitutional procedures of the participating countries. "8  The
Community has the features of a supranational organization with all
that this implies."9  While the AEC Treaty does not refer to
sovereignty or domestic jurisdiction,20 the Community is about the
division of competence between it and the member states. 21  In
addition, the AEC Treaty requires the coordination and
harmonization of laws and policies across all spectrums of
1963 E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963) (discussing the obligation imposed on
individuals and member states to uphold the terms of the Treaty); Case 6/64, Costa v.
ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964) (discussing the proper balance
between national laws and Treaty obligations, as well as which entity should litigate
conflicts).
"5 Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 1964 C.M.L.R (1964).
116 See Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1449-51. The authors see the issue as
one of national sovereignty versus supranationality. See id.
117 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, pmbl.
118 See id. art. 100. For a discussion of some general problems in the ratification
process, see Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1448-49.
119 In the context of the EC, these implications have been elaborated upon by the ECJ.
See Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963
E.C.R. 1, 1963 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
120 See Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1450.
12 1 This question remains controversial in EC law. See EC TREATY, supra note 18, art.
3b (the subsidiarity clause). See also Brunner v. The European Union Treaty, 1 C.M.L.R.
57 (1994) (Federal Constitutional Court of Germany) (noting that "the protection of
fundamental rights provided by the German constitution is not displaced by supra-national
law").
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activity. 12 2 The Community is unlikely to function effectively until
and unless it is accorded supremacy in its areas of competence.
How will its objectives ever be achieved if conflicting national laws
are given precedence over AEC law? Logic dictates that AEC law
must have priority over national legislation. Article 5 of the Treaty
does seem to lend support to the principle of supremacy of
Community law over national law.2 3  Thus, it follows from the
precedent provided by the jurisprudence of the ECJ that AEC law
must not be invalidated by national law24 or annulled by domestic
courts. Conflicting national legislation must be either
superseded 6 or set aside at the initiative of domestic courts, 27 and
relevant national law must always be interpreted in light of AEC
law.' In this context, the application of the principle of direct effect
of AEC law will be of paramount importance in securing the
harmonization of member states' legislation.
V. Membership Issues
1. Accession to and Withdrawal from the AEC
Article 102(1) provides that any OAU member state may accede
to the Community by addressing to its Secretary-General a
communication to that effect. 9 The procedure for admission is very
straightforward: it is decided by a simple majority of the existing
members. 3 ° Thus, unlike the EC, there is no involvement of the
122 See, e.g., AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 39 (discussing customs cooperation and
administration), 40 (discussing trade documents and procedures).
123 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 749.
124 See Case 11/70, Intemationale Handelsgesellschaft GmbH v. Einfuhr-und-
Vorratsstelle ffir Getreide und Futtermittel, 1970 E.C.R. 1125.
125 See Case 314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lfibeck-Ost, 1987 E.C.R. 4199,
4199-4200.
126 See Case 196/77, Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal SpA,
1978 E.C.R. 629, 629-30.
127 See C-221/89, The Queen v. Sec'y of State for Transp., exparte Factortame Ltd.
(No 2), 1991 E.C.R. 1-3905.
121 See Case C-106/89, Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Intemacionale de
Alimentacion SA, 1990 E.C.R. 1-4135, 4135-36.
129 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 102.
130 See id. art. 102(2).
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Community organs in the accession process."' Although this does
expedite proceedings, it has the negative consequence that no study
is undertaken by the Community on whether the proposed member
is in the position to fulfill the obligations imposed by the Treaty.
Withdrawal from the Community is envisaged in Article 104.132
Any member state wishing to secede must give one year's written
notice to the Secretary-General.'33 Any such notice may be canceled
at any time during this period. 34  The withdrawal shall become
effective upon expiration of the one year period.'35 The notice for
secession does not exonerate the member state in question from
complying with its duties throughout the one year period; the
member state is bound to discharge its obligations up to the date
that withdrawal becomes effective.'36
There is no stipulation in the Treaty as to what will happen if
these obligations are not fulfilled.'37 As Article 104 is worded, it
appears that secession occurs automatically upon expiration of the
one year period and the Community does not have the right to
postpone the withdrawal until all obligations are fully discharged.'
The Treaty also foresees the possibility of the Community's
dissolution. '" According to Article 105, the Assembly is
empowered to dissolve the Community and determine the
conditions for distributing its assets and liabilities.' 40 It is rather
peculiar that the Treaty does not stipulate what grounds may justify
dissolution. The constitutive instruments of other international
organizations anticipating such possibility usually make dissolution
contingent on a significant decrease of member states. 14' However,
..' See id.; cf EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 300.
132 See AEC TREATY, supra note 17, art. 104.
133 See id. art. 104(1).
134 See id.
3 See id.
136 See id. art. 104(2).
117 See id. art. 104.
138 See id.
139 See id. art. 105.
140 See id.
"' See, e.g., Convention Establishing the European Space Agency, May 30, 1975,
art. 25, 14 I.L.M. 855; Convention Establishing the International Fund for
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this does not appear to be very relevant here, as the Community
already numbers fifty-one member states.142 Another possible
ground for dissolution might be that the AEC does not achieve, or it
appears questionable whether it will ever secure, its aims and
objectives. 143 Notwithstanding the significant political, economic,
and monetary questions raised, the dissolution would also bring
about complex institutional implications, especially if all six stages
have already been concluded.
2. Suspension of Membership Rights
The AEC Treaty envisages suspension of membership rights and
privileges in two situations.'" The first is regulated by Article 5(3):
any member persistently failing to honor its general undertakings or
abide by Community decisions or regulations may be subjected to
sanctions by the Assembly upon the action recommended by the
Council. 14'5  These sanctions may be lifted by the Assembly
following the Council's recommendation. 1
46
It is rather difficult to determine whether the only measure
expressly mentioned, namely the suspension of membership rights,
should be understood as the "upper limit" of such sanctions, in other
words, whether the Assembly is allowed to take more severe action.
An affirmative answer raises the obvious question whether Article
5(3) gives it carte blanche to go as far as expelling a member.
Whereas expulsion is, undoubtedly, a sanction in the ordinary
meaning of the word, it is submitted that the word "sanctions" in the
context of this provision refers to measures that, on the one hand,
inflict "punishment" on errant members and, on the other hand, aim
at securing compliance with obligations. If this distinction is valid,
it follows that expulsion is not a sanction in the meaning of Article
5(3) because it only punishes the recalcitrant state by permanently
terminating its membership.
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, art. 43, 23 I.L.M. 177.
142 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, pmbl.
143 See id.
144 See SERGEI A. VOITOVICH, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORGANIZATIONS IN THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS 147 (1995).
145 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 5; Protocol, supra note 25, art. 21(3).
146 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 5(3).
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The second situation for suspension of membership rights is
regulated by Article 84: member states in arrears equaling or
exceeding the assessed amount for the previous two financial years
are threatened with having their membership rights suspended.'47
The decision is reached by the Assembly, and the Council has no
role to play here. 148  Article 84 enumerates the consequences for
suspended members, the most important being that they lose the
right to vote or participate in Community decisions. 149 Considering
that, according to Article 10(1), the word "decisions" describes the
legally binding legislative acts that the Assembly adopts, it could be
argued that this sanction does not extend to regulations, the
legislative acts which are taken by the Council. 5° This argument is
in conformity with the provision of Article 13(2), whereby
regulations acquire their mandatory nature once they have been
approved by the Assembly. 5' Thus, the conclusion could be
reached that the member in arrears is allowed to vote in the Council
but is excluded from the Assembly.
Despite the draconian nature of Article 84, the drafters, being
aware of the difficult economic situation in Africa, inserted Article
84(2) which contains a force majeure clause.' Thus, the Assembly
is authorized to defer the enforcement of sanctions relating to non-
payment of contributions if it is satisfied, on the basis of a well
supported and detailed report prepared by the member in question,
that the non-fulfillment of the financial obligations is due to
circumstances beyond the control of the recalcitrant state. '
14 See id. art. 84. Article 82(2) of the AEC Treaty expressly provides that the
Community budget shall be funded by contributions of member states. See id. art. 82(2);
Lumu, supra note 17, at 63.
48 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 84.
149 See id. art. 84(1). Other consequences include losing the right to enjoy Treaty
benefits, to address meetings, and to present candidates for vacant Community posts. See
id. There is no enumeration of the consequences of suspension of membership rights
ordered under Article 5(3). See id. art. 5(3). They are likely to be the same as those in
Article 84(1). See id. art. 84(1).
"o See id. art. 10.
'5' See id. art. 13(2).
152 See id. art. 84(2).
153 For a similar clause, which extends to the non-fulfilment of any obligation, see
ECOWAS Treaty, supra note 25, art. 77(3).
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Furthermore, members may be released from the obligation to pay
financial contributions on the basis of Article 79.154 It stipulates that
the least developed, land-locked, and island countries shall be
granted, where appropriate, temporary exception from the full
application of certain Treaty provisions. '55
Article 5(3) requires that members must have persistently failed
to honor their undertakings or abide by decisions or regulations
before suspension can be contemplated.'56 The Treaty reserves a
special role in this procedure for the Court of Justice. The
Assembly is compelled, in pursuance to Article 8(3)(k), to refer to
the Court any matter in which it has determined that a member state
has not honored any of its obligations."7 The jurisdiction with
which the Treaty has endowed the Court signifies that Assembly
decisions concluding that a state has infringed its duties are not of a
juridical nature, as the Assembly may not act in any quasi-judicial
capacity; its decisions are only determinations of fact.5 8
Suspended member states may take advantage of the judicial
review system of Community acts that the AEC Treaty has
established. 1' Thus, if a member believes that the decision
suspending its membership rights is legally defective, it can invoke
Article 18(3)(a) conferring exclusive competence on the Court to
decide on member states' actions against a decision on the grounds
that the Assembly lacked the necessary competence or abused its
powers.' 6' Since the disputed decision on suspension is based on the
prior determination that the member in question had violated its
obligations, it follows that, in these circumstances, the Court's role
is only to adjudicate whether the contested decision is
unconstitutional or ultra vires and may not act as an appellate body
on the issue of Treaty, infringements, as this has already been
resolved authoritatively in the context of the Article 8(3)(k)
114 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 79(l)-(2).
"I See id. Under Article 78(1) of the AEC Treaty, signatory states have already agreed
to grant such exemptions to Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. See id. art 78(1).
156 See id. art. 5(3).
157 See id. art. 8(3)(k).
158 See id. arts. 7, 8, 18.
151 See id. art. 18.
160 See id.
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During suspension proceedings the Court of Justice has an
important role to play, particularly in determining that the sanctions
imposed against the recalcitrant member state are in accordance with
the relevant Treaty provisions. However, the Court may not
encroach upon the domain of the Assembly and must respect all
material findings in its decisions. Because Article 19 makes Court
judgments binding upon member states and Community organs, the
AEC is well equipped to ensure that the rule of law is observed
during the imposition of sanctions. 
162
VI. The Regulation of Substantive Law in the AEC Treaty
The Treaty seeks to regulate various areas of economic activity
at both regional and continental levels.
1. Customs Union and Liberalization of Trade
Article 29 requires the progressive establishment of a customs
union and the adoption of a common external customs tariff.'63
Subsequent provisions set out how these objectives are to be
achieved and include: a prohibition on the imposition of any new
customs duties or the increase of existing ones with the aim of
eventual elimination of customs duties; 64 the relaxation and ultimate
prohibition of quota restrictions and other non-tariff barriers; 16 the
establishment of a common external customs tariff applicable to
goods originating from third party counties imported into member
states; 66 a prohibition on customs duties on goods originating in one
member state and imported into another and on goods originating
from third party countries in free circulation in member states; 16' a
161 See id. arts. 7, 8, 18.
162 See id. art. 19.
163 See id. art. 29. These measures are to be taken at the level of regional economic
communities. See Protocol, supra note 25, arts. 13, 14.
16 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 30(1)-(2), 33(1).
165 See id. art. 31(1). Curiously, the AEC Treaty does not seem to include a provision
prohibiting quotas on exports between member states comparable to the EC Treaty. See
EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 34.
166 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 32(1).
167 See id. art. 33(1). According to paragraph (3), goods from third party states are
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ban on national legislation directly or indirectly discriminating
against products originating from another member state; 6 ' a
proscription on internal taxes in excess of those levied on similar
domestic goods originating from a member state and imported into
another; 16 and the progressive elimination of internal taxes levied
for the protection of domestic products. 70
The experience of the EC demonstrates that states are ingenious
in developing all kinds of new barriers obstructing the free
movement of goods in order to protect domestically produced
goods. 7' Therefore, the phrase "and all measures having equivalent
effect' 72 should have been inserted in the relevant provisions of the
AEC Treaty.' As the situation now stands, it will take a great effort
by the Court of Justice to build consistent case law declaring such
barriers incompatible with the AEC Treaty.
As is the case in all other REIOs, 74 the AEC Treaty permits
members to derogate from the application of these provisions if
certain conditions are present.'75 However, as Article 35 expressly
states, none of these derogations may be used to discriminate
arbitrarily against other members. 7 6  It is not clear whether the
derogations are subject to the principle of proportionality, in other
words, whether members are allowed to derogate only to the degree
considered to be in free circulation in a member state where the import formalities have
been complied with, where customs duties have been paid in the member state, and where
the goods have not benefited from any exemption from custom duties. See id.
168 See id. art. 33(4).
169 See id. art. 34(1).
170 See id. art. 34(2).
'7' See, e.g., Cases 51 and 54/71 International Fruit v. Produktshap voor Groenten
en Fruit, 1971 E.C.R. 1116.
172 EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 30.
173 See id. arts. 30-34; AEC TREATY arts. 29-34; see also Ren6 Barents, Charges of
Equivalent Effect to Customs Duties, 15 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 415 (1978) (describing
difficulties encountered by EC member states due to measures imposed by other member
states having an effect equivalent to customs duties on imports and exports); Ren6 Barents,
New Developments in Measures Having Equivalent Effects, 18 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 271
(1981) (discussing developments in case law interpreting Articles 30-36 of the EC Treaty).
17 See EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 36.
"I See AEC TREATY, supra note 17, art. 35.
176 See id.
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that appears to be absolutely necessary under the circumstances.1"
The grounds of derogation, which appear to be exhaustive, refer to
national security, control of arms and military equipment,
safeguarding health, human life, and public morality, preservation of
national treasures of artistic or archaeological value, protection of
industrial, commercial, and intellectual property, exportation of
strategic minerals, protection of infant industries, control of
hazardous wastes and nuclear materials, balance of payment
difficulties, and serious economic damage because of imports from
another member state.
78
Other areas of cooperation include re-exportation of goods and
intra-community transit facilities, 79 harmonization of customs
procedures,8 simplification of trade documents and procedures,181
corrective measures in respect of substantial diversion of trade
arising from barter agreements, 2 and trade promotion.' 3 In relation
to intra-community trade, Article 37 requires member states to
accord one another most-favored-nation treatment, and in no case
must tariff concessions granted to a third party country be more
favorable than those applicable under the AEC Treaty.' 4 Clearly,
member states must never be put at a disadvantage vis-A-vis third
party countries. However, it remains to be seen whether this
provision will affect negatively the trade between member states and
the former colonial powers.
2. Free Movement of Persons
Pursuant to Article 43, member states undertake to progressively
177 See Case 145/88, Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q plc, 1989 E.C.R. 3851.
Under the AEC Treaty, the Council oversees the operation of such restrictions and
prohibitions and is authorized to take appropriate action in this regard. See AEC TREATY,
supra note 7, art. 35(6). This could include seeking an advisory opinion from the Court on
whether national measures are compatible with AEC law. See id.
178 See EC TREATY, supra note 18, arts. 36, 115.
179 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 38.
180 See id. art. 39.
181 See id. art. 40.
182 See id. art. 41.
183 See id. art. 42.
'g4 See id. art. 37.
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secure for their nationals the rights of free movement, of residence,
and of establishment within the Community."' The details have
been left to be regulated in a Protocol. 86 The free movement of
persons is an essential element of economic integration. 7 By
analogy to the EC experience,' 8 the issues which will need to be
addressed in the Protocol include rights of entry and residence; the
right to take up offers of employment; the right to seekS .189
employment; ights associated with employment, equality in
employment, unemployment, and incapacity to work, and the right
to remain after employment; family rights, including the rights of
non-AEC national dependents; entitlement to social security; '9°
access to public sector employment; the mutual recognition of
qualifications; the rights of legal persons; 9' and derogations on
grounds of public policy, public security, or public health, and the
appropriate safeguards for persons whose rights of free movement
may be restricted on such grounds. 92
3. Monetary, Finance and Payment Policies
Member states are to harmonize their monetary, financial, and
185 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 43. The EC Treaty uses the term
"movement of workers," which is much more restrictive than "movement of persons."
EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 48. Although Article 43 of the AEC Treaty has been
drafted in very brief terms, it would appear that it anticipates a general movement of
population and not just workers. See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 43. No express
provision is made for the freedom to provide services, although the scope of the provision
seems broad enough to encompass this freedom. Cf. EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 60.
186 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 43(2).
117 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 71(2)(a). Thompson laments the lack of
reference to "Community citizenship," since he regards a common position on this issue as
imperative for the accomplishment of the AEC's goals. Thompson, supra note 17, at 753-
54. Cf. EC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 8. The free movement of persons is described as
one of the "fundamental freedoms" of EC Law. Case 53/81, Levin v. Staatssecretaris van
Justicie, 1982 E.C.R. 1035.
188 See CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW, supra note 78, chs.
13-16.
189 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, arts. 71(2)(b), (e).
190 See id. art. 72(2)(b).
'9' Article 43(1) of the AEC Treaty must be read as applicable to legal persons, or the
policies to be pursued under Articles 44-45 would be considerably hindered. See id. arts.
43(1), 44-45; cf. EC TREATY, supra note 18, arts. 52, 58.
192 See AEC TREATY, supra note 7, art. 72(2)(g).
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payment policies, including the insurance and banking sectors, with
the eventual aim of establishing an African Monetary Union.1 93
Furthermore, the free movement of capital is to be achieved
through the elimination of restrictions on the transfer of capital
between member states." This should facilitate the opening of bank
accounts with, or the obtaining of loans from, a financial institution
in another member state. However, the risk exists that the
liberalization of monetary controls, particularly exchange controls,
exacerbated by the problems of globalization, could lead to the
flight of funds from the less stable to the more politically and
economically stable countries. If the free movement of persons is to
be accomplished, then restrictions on the movement of capital
belonging to residents of the various member states must be reduced
accordingly.
VII. Conclusion
The creation of the AEC is an ambitious (some might argue
overly ambitious) project that reflects the global trend towards
regional economic integration. In addition, it is a clear indication of
the readiness of African states to confront and solve their economic
problems through indigenous solutions and to turn away from their
heavy reliance on aid and the economic policies foisted upon them
by international institutions. Each stage successfully completed in
this project will constitute a significant boost to the confidence of
African countries and should contribute to the removal of the
animosity and confrontation that have plagued the continent.
However, there cannot be any doubt that this long-term
proposition is littered with obstacles to overcome. The success of
the AEC will depend to a large measure on the political attitude of
its members, particularly whether they will be prepared to surrender
the degree of control over their financial and economic affairs which
is indispensable for the Community's proper functioning. Enmities
and rivalries will have to be set aside permanently and replaced by
conditions of good neighborliness. The weakness and
mismanagement of many African economies also pose obvious
193 See id. art. 44.
194 See id. art. 45.
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difficulties. Indeed, they should not be underestimated. One only
has to compare the economic and political hurdles that have plagued
the European Union in its march towards greater integration to
appreciate that the unsophisticated economies of most African states
will not be in a position to meet the stages set by the AEC Treaty.
But neither should legal problems be underestimated. The
diversity of legal systems and the differences in commercial,
company, and mercantile laws will not facilitate cooperation and
harmonization."' Moreover, it would seem that many such laws are
so antiquated that they will be unable to meet the challenges
ahead.196 Law reform, usually a painfully slow process, appears
necessary on a vast scale as a condition precedent for the success of
the AEC. Nevertheless, these difficulties should not be exaggerated
since the states of the EC have faced similar hurdles that have been
overcome and that Community continues to evolve towards a longer
term project. In principle, the AEC Treaty seems sound enough to
fulfill its objectives, but whether it will function in practice remains
to be seen. Much will depend on the various Protocols, which are
yet to be drafted, and on the creativity of the Court of Justice, whose
pivotal role could compensate for certain deficiencies or
shortcomings of the Treaty. The success of the AEC will depend in
large measure on the political will of the member states to put aside
their differences, to suppress the national interest, and to cooperate
through the Assembly and Council to attain the AEC's objectives.'97
19 See Ndulo, supra note 1, at 107-09; Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1452-
53.
196 See Thompson & Mukisa, supra note 17, at 1453-54.
197 See Thompson, supra note 17, at 762.
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